Abstract. Traces of RFID-equipped item can be used to detect counterfeits. Nevertheless companies are reluctant to share the necessary traces, since it is unclear what can be inferred from them. In this paper we present a provably secure pattern matching algorithm that can be used for distributed anomaly detection. We improve performance and detection capabilities compared to competing approaches by storing partial, malleable information on the RFID tag.
Introduction
Counterfeit products lead to huge financial losses for legally run business. For example, European Customs seize up to one hundred million counterfeit articles per year [6] . It is well-known that RFID event traces can be used for anti-counterfeiting [15, 24, 19, 26] . Yet companies are still reluctant to share the necessary data, since it is unclear what other information can be inferred from it [13, 22] .
Cryptography offers the ultimate solution: Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMC) [3, 9, 25] . In SMC a number of parties compute a joint function on their combined inputs without revealing any additional information except the result. Since general SMC allows the computation of any function, this function could be the correlation algorithm. Du and Atallah [5] have first proposed this setup.
SMC can be used for rather simple, infrequently used correlations [26] , but it is still prohibitively slow for large-scale problems. The first measurements show a performance penalty compared to non-private computation on the order of tens of thousands [11, 12] and even specialized protocols such as [26] only scale to a few clients. Implementations of privacy-preserving event correlation [14, 16, 17, 20] therefore suggest alternative techniques. These techniques commonly rely on revealing the information necessary for the detection algorithm while revealing as little as possible additional information.
In this paper we use a different approach. We present a provably secure algorithm for a function with limited privacy. Our algorithm implements pattern matching which can be used as the building block for anomaly detection. We complement the secure protocol by storing partial, malleable (by the attacker) information on the RFID tag. We experimentally evaluate the performance of our algorithm and it is acceptable for the intended use case.
In summary this paper contributes a privacy-preserving pattern matching algorithm that -is provably secure and reveals no information if the pattern does not match. -can be used to implement anomaly detection, e.g. for anti-counterfeiting.
-is efficient and can detect a counterfeit in less than 1 second using 20 KBytes of network communication in our use case example.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Related work is reviewed in Section 2. The explanation of our anomaly detection algorithm for anti-counterfeiting follows in Section 3. We then continue by describing the privacy-preserving pattern matching algorithm in Section 4. We evaluate the computation and communication performance of this system in Section 5. Our conclusions are presented in Section 6.
Related Work

RFID for Anti-Counterfeiting
The idea of our use case that RFID event data can be used for anticounterfeiting has been first suggested in [24] . The first algorithm to detect changes in the owner (attached item in our case) has been presented in [18] . It is purely an anomaly-based detection approach and assumes a central repository of events. A refinement to deal with incomplete traces based on a stochastic detection approach is presented in [15] . The algorithm learns the transition probability from one event to another and identifies low probability transitions. The approach used in this paper based on an evaluation of complete traces was first presented in [19] .
The first privacy-preserving RFID counterfeit detection algorithm is presented almost concurrently with this paper in [26] . We improve over this approach in two aspects: First, we enhance detection capabilities by the ability to detect more patterns. Instead of only two types of eventssend and receive -we support an arbitrary number of events. Our detection algorithm has been independently evaluated in [19] . This enhanced capabilities make our algorithm also more general and applicable to related problems in distributed anomaly detection.
Second, we significantly improve performance. In particular, we do not use heavy weight secure computations in order to compute the ordering of events. Instead we store this information on the RFID tag, but ensure that in case the attacker maliciously modifies this information we are still able to detect the pattern (w.h.p.). Our numbers show better performance for a significantly increased case study.
Privacy in Distributed Intrusion Detection
This paragraph provides an overview on protecting privacy in distributed intrusion detection. The first proposal for a practical system was made in [16] . Its introduces the model with a central correlation agent also used in this paper. Privacy is achieved by cleverly pseudonymizing sensitive fields. Further pseudonymizing techniques are given in [14] . An implementation based on Bloom filters as pseudonymizing technique is described in [17, 20] .
In [1] key-word based aggregation using encryption and SMC has been implemented. They split the central correlation agent into two mutually distrustful ones. The first called proxy anonymizes the data and the second called database computes the correlation on the anonymized plaintext. This can only be done if the plaintext does not reveal sensitive information. We emphasize that their algorithms are not meant to be run on-line for each event.
In [4] SMC has been implemented for detecting frequent events using entropy and counters. They report running times on the order of minutes and communication on the order of several MBytes and claim an improvement of a factor of roughly 1000 over general frameworks, such as FairPlayMP [2] . No figures are given with respect to non-private computation, but we see a similarity in functionality and reported performance to [11, 12] . Their algorithms use locally pre-aggregated events as input and are therefore also not run on-line for each event.
Efficient protocols for the two-party case of our pattern matching algorithm are given in [10] . The two-party case is significantly simpler, not only because of the limited number of participants, but also, since the pattern is not distributed, it does not need to be sorted. We extend that to the multi-party case and are significantly more efficient.
The advantages an attacker might have from a centralized detection system despite privacy protection are described in [21] . This corresponds to the common problem of privacy-preserving computation that the result may still reveal sensitive information. We recommend to treat detected events -counterfeits -with the necessary care and confidentiality.
Anomaly Detection for Anti-Counterfeiting
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) enables tracking individual products through the supply chain [23] . An RFID tag with an unique identifier (UID) is attached to each item and captured at distinct read points within companies handling the item. A suitable reading device is used to read the UID and a corresponding event is stored in a local database of the company. By default, each company has only access to RFID event data that was captured by readers belonging to the organization.
An event in our algorithm corresponds to reading an RFID tag. When a company X k processes an item with attached tag with UID id it creates an event with e.y j = k (i.e. the event type is the organization's identity). Recall that X k reads the event number j from the tag. As the item is forwarded along the supply chain, different companies create events for the same tag. Our pattern matching algorithm is applied to an event trace t for a specific tag with UID id. The correlation agent therefore initially sends id to the event sources.
We will now describe the different possibilities of counterfeiters to distribute fakes and the consequences of these actions on the event traces. Suppose all items of a certain type are equipped with UIDs. The first challenge for the counterfeiter is thus to obtain UIDs for the counterfeited goods. One option is to put no identifier at all on the item, but this strategy is easily detectable during authentication. For actually obtaining a UID, the options include guessing random numbers, transferring the UIDs of genuine products to counterfeits or copying the UIDs found on genuine products. For transferring UIDs, counterfeiters may remove (steal) RFID tags from genuine items and reapply them to counterfeits, or they may seek access to UIDs of disposed products and reuse the tags. As a consequence, the UID on a counterfeit product will be either duplicated (in case of copying) or truly unique (for transfer and most probably guessing). Furthermore, the UID will either be valid (for copying and transferring), meaning that a genuine item carrying the same UID exists, or invalid (for guessing). Any UID found on a counterfeit thus has at least one of these properties: it is invalid, has been transferred or is duplicated.
Besides obtaining UIDs, a counterfeiter must distribute the counterfeits and put them on the market, choosing a suitable location and time. Counterfeits can be distributed through illicit supply chains or injected in licit supply chains. Examples of illicit distribution are the smuggling of goods through customs and the sale on flea markets. Selling counterfeits in online shops is another increasingly popular distribution strategy. Counterfeiters also misuse the licit supply chain, sometimes mixing counterfeits with genuine products to better disguise them. For the resulting trace of items it is most relevant whether the chosen channels are visible, i.e. readers are deployed and item movements are captured, or invisible. Illicit distribution channels are likely to contain no read points and thus be invisible, while licit channels can be assumed to be visible. In case a counterfeit carries a transferred UID (valid and unique), the events in the trace were triggered by the movements of two items: First by the genuine item until its UID was removed, then by the counterfeit carrying the stolen UID. Up to the transfer point, the trace will be that of a genuine item. When the counterfeit is re-injected in the licit supply chain, the sequence of events will only be valid if the counterfeit directly replaces a genuine item. If the injection takes place further upstream ( Figure 1 part (a) ), downstream ( Figure 1 part (b) ) or in another branch of the supply chain (Figure 1 part (c) ), the trace will not conform to the traces of genuine items. The resulting traces contain transitions that are forbidden for genuine items, e.g., the transition B → B in Figure 1 part (a).
If counterfeits with duplicate UIDs are injected in the supply chain, the trace that is retrieved for the UID is a mix of all sub-traces created by the multiple items carrying the same UID (Figure 1 part (d) ). If items with copied UIDs are injected in the supply chain, this will result in an invalid global trace that contains transitions between events created for different items, albeit they carry the same UID. For example, let event A be triggered by a genuine item, and let it be followed by event U , triggered by a counterfeit with a copied UID. The resulting transition from A → U is not allowed for genuine items as they would never travel on that path.
If counterfeits with guessed, i.e. invalid, but unique, UIDs are injected in the supply chain, the trace will be incomplete unless the counterfeiter manages to inject it at a licit producer. In all other cases, the trace starts with an invalid first event, e.g., B (Figure 1 part (e)) which is not allowed for genuine items, as they need to originate at an authorized producer.
Exploiting the impact of counterfeits on event traces, we model counterfeits as anomalies. We consider the set of all possible links between companies in the supply chain, i.e. pattern length n = 2. We then divide this set into "allowed" and "illegal" links. In order to detect a counterfeit the correlation agent S sends all patterns corresponding to "illegal" links (anomalies) to all event sources. If a match is detected, an investigation for counterfeits starts.
Note that our privacy guarantee only supports anomaly detection, i.e. detection of unwanted events, and not specification-based algorithms, i.e. detection of wanted behavior, since it reveals additional information in case of a match. This leakage is acceptable for anomalies, but in most cases not for compliant actions.
Privacy-Preserving Pattern Matching
Pattern Matching Function
An event trace t consists of a variable number of events e j (j = 1, . . . , m). These events may be distributed across up to l parties X k , i.e. each party X k has a (usually but not necessarily consecutive) subset of the events e j .
For now, we assume that each party is aware of the numbering of its events, i.e. each party knows j of its events e j . We will revisit this assumption in Section 4.5 and show a method how to obtain the numbering without additional privacy-preserving computation.
Each event e j has an event type e j .y from a finite set of types. A pattern p is a sequence of n event types p.y i (i = 1, . . . , n) . It matches an event trace t, if there are n consecutive events e j , such that e j .y = p.y i (j = β, . . . , β + n − 1, i = 1, . . . , n). Loosely speaking, we slide the pattern over the event trace and if there is any position where event trace (completely) matches the pattern, the pattern matches the event trace.
Fig. 2. Example of applying the basic mechanism
Consider the example of Figure 2 . There are event types x, y, z and the event trace is y, x, y, z. It is distributed over the parties X 1 , X 2 , X 3 . The pattern p is y, z. The pattern p is slid across the event trace and is depicted for positions γ = 1, 2, 3. A bold, gray font indicates a match.
Protocol
We show how to implement this pattern matching algorithm using a distributed privacy-preserving protocol. Our privacy goal is that no information about the events (i.e. their type) is revealed, if the pattern does not match. If the pattern matches, the sources of the events may be revealed. Their type is implicitly revealed by the match. Patterns are public and may be revealed to the data sources.
We use a pseudo-random function P RF (·, key) with a key key as the basis of our scheme. The secret key is known to all event sources X k , but not the central correlation agent S. We assume that the output of the pseudo-random function cannot be distinguished from truely random numbers, i.e. given pairs m i , P RF (m i , key) and a number r it is impossible to determine whether r = P RF (m, key) for any m = m i . In practice one uses a message authentication code (MAC) function which is resistant to MAC forgery.
Let n be the length of the pattern. The correlation agent S sends the pattern p to each event source X k . Each party X k looks up its events e j . Let J k be the set of numbers of found events at X k . X k now considers each possible combination of positions γ ∈ {min(j|j ∈ J k ) − n + 1, . . . , max(j|j ∈ J k )} in its events and corresponding positions δ ∈ {i|0 ≤ i < n ∧ γ + i ∈ J k } X k in the pattern. For each pair γ, δ it computes a hashed value x γ,δ . The value x γ,δ is the keyed hash of the concatentation of γ and δ, if there is a match of event and pattern at this pair of positions. Since the correlation agent S does not know the PRF key key, this maintains the privacy of the match towards it.
The key insight is that, since the PRF key key is known to all event sources, the hashes of other sources are known in case of a match. We therefore assign a special role to the event source matching the last pattern position (δ = n − 1). It does not compute the keyed hash in case of a match, but computes the hashes of all other pairs (which may be at other sources) and then their negated sum, such that the subset of x γ,δ for this pattern position in the event trace adds up to 0.
In case of mismatch, X k chooses an uniform random number r from the domain of the pseudo-random function. If any source for a pattern position chooses a random number (i.e. there is a mismatch), the sum will be random as well.
The formula for x γ,δ is
In order to not reveal information about the position of a match X k permutes its set of x γ,δ . But, since there are n x γ,δ for each γ with δ = 0, . . . , n − 1, X k may reveal the δ for each x γ,δ . So, X k sends to S a randomly permuted set of pairs x γ,δ , δ .
Note that, if events at one party are consecutive, there are n|J k | such pairs, i.e. we reveal the number of events an event source has. To conceal that an event source has no events it can send r ′ · n pairs with a random number for x γ,δ . To conceal the number of events all parties must agree on an upper bound u and always send u · n pairs (padded with random numbers).
After receiving the pairs the correlation agent S sorts all of them in ascending order of their second value δ in the pair. S computes the sum for each possible combination τ 1 , . . . , τ n of pairs x τ 1 , 0 , . . . , x τn , n − 1 that spans all values of δ. Due to the algorithm for computing x γ,δ this n i=1 x τ i = 0 will be equal to 0, if the pattern p matches the event trace t.
Consider party X 2 in the example from Figure 2 : it has events at positions 2 and 3 and needs to compare for pattern positions γ = 1, 2, 3. It computes the pairs x 1,1 = r, 1 , x 2,0 = r ′ , 0 , x 2,1 = r ′′ , 1 and x 3,0 = P RF (3.0, key), 0 . Since the length of the pattern is equal or below the number of its consecutive events and a match at positions inside its events can be determined by itself, but did not occur, X 2 can choose to omit the pairs for γ = 2. Party X 3 has an event at position 4 and computes x 3,1 = −P RF (3.0, key), 1 . It holds that x 3,0 + x 3,1 = 0, such that the correlation agent can detect the match.
Determining the Bit-Length of the PRF
Let κ be the bit-length of the PRF used above. We need to determine κ, such that false positives are unlikely. The correlation agent S receives nlu pairs using the algorithm above. It can then form (lu) n possible combinations of pairs, such that the following must hold
for false positives to be negligible. In our use case example given in Section 5 we have l = 15, u = 1 and n = 2, i.e. κ ≫ 7.81. In this case we can save communication cost and even condense common PRF functions, such as HMAC based on SHA-1, by sending only the first 32 bits.
Security
As the event sources X k do not share data with each other, but only with the correlation agent S, there is no risk of revealing information to other sources. We only need to prove privacy towards S. Assume the simplest attack where S tries to infer the event type of some victim X ⋆ . We argue that by using our algorithm it cannot do so and does not obtain any additional knowledge about the events at X ⋆ , i.e. our algorithm preserves the privacy of the events. We play the following game: S sends some pattern p of his choice to all X k and receives the pairs x γ,δ , δ in return including x γ ⋆ ,δ ⋆ , δ ⋆ from X ⋆ . We assume that the pattern p does not match the event trace beginning at position γ ⋆ , since that would reveal X ⋆ 's type from the result of the comparison. S is then asked to tell whether x γ ⋆ ,δ ⋆ is the PRF or a random number, i.e. whether X ⋆ has a matching event type at pattern position δ ⋆ . Theorem 1 Let m be the maximum number of events. If any adversary S wins the game above with probability 1 2 + ǫ, then there is an algorithm B that successfully distinguishes PRF outputs with probability at least ǫ m . Proof. If S outputs random number, B outputs a random guess for the PRF pair. If S outputs PRF, B chooses a random starting position j (j ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1}) for γ ⋆ . S knows δ ⋆ of x γ ⋆ ,δ ⋆ which is presumably P RF (γ ⋆ .δ ⋆ , key). So B outputs j.δ ⋆ , x γ ⋆ ,δ ⋆ as its guess for the PRF pair. Its chances of success are ǫ m (which is independent of the bit-length κ of the PRF).
Our security model could be translated into the semi-honest model for SMC [8] . Yet the ideal functionality is difficult to specify. Each event source's input are its events and their numbers. The correlation agent has no input, but the pattern is part of the (public) function to be computed. The output is whether there is a match and in case of a match the positions in the pattern of the sources' events comprising the match.
On the one hand, this is limited compared to other possible ideal SMC functionalities. E.g., SMC would allow implementing a function where the event sources input their events and correlation agent the pattern. The output would be a bit whether there is a match or not. This would clearly improve security by privacy for the pattern and privacy in the case of a match, but we remind the reader that we chose the function, such that its implementation can be efficient.
On the other hand, our security definition extends semi-honest security. No matter how the correlation agent behaves it is not able to infer information. This does not yet correspond to malicious or covert adversaries, since we do not protect the integrity of the computation, but confidentiality holds even against active adversaries.
Detection of Missing Events
So far we made the assumption that each party X k is aware of the numbering of its events, i.e. each party knows the j of its events e j . Since we are using RFID tags to generate the events, the simplest method to achieve this is to store j on the RFID tag. After reading the tag and storing the event in its database X k updates j to j + 1 on the tag.
In order to raise the bar for a counterfeiter, the initial number should be randomized. Nevertheless a counterfeiter may interfere with the supply chain and alter the stored number of counterfeit goods. This may create overlapping event numbers which the pattern matching algorithm will still detect or missing event numbers which require additional consideration.
We extend our pattern matching algorithm to be able to detect missing events. The correlation agent sends a pattern p with event type p.y i = ⋆ which matches an event trace t at position β, if no event source X k has any event e β+i−1 .
The idea is very similar to the one for pattern matching. If no event source has an event, everyone knows the hashes of the other sources, such that we can control the sum. The difference is that this time the sum is computed for a specific pattern position δ = i, such that this sum must be a summand x γ,i = P RF (γ.i, key) for the sum computed as above.
We assign the special role to event source X l . Each party X k (1 ≤ k < l), i.e. everybody except X l computes
The detection algorithm at the correlation agent S is slightly different and actually has become simpler. Note that S knows i where p.y i = ⋆. It computes the sum x γ,i = l k=1 x ⋆ γ,i,k over all event sources and uses this one value x γ,i in the above detection algorithm (where there used to be l).
We omit the security proof for brevity, since it follows the same construction as before. Simply note that detection of a missing event without a complete pattern match implies PRF distinguishability.
Evaluation
We evaluate the performance and communication cost of our algorithm as used for anti-counterfeiting. We model the supply chain as a q stage process. The length m of a trace is then equal to q.
First, we estimate the number of necessary patterns ("illegal links"). Let f (χ) be the discrete probability density function of the number of companies in one stage of the supply chain and F (χ) be its cumulative distribution function. We assume all stages are independent identically distributed. Then the expected number of allowed links between two stages is a = E(χ 2 ) = E(χ)E(χ)
The expected number of all links is qE(χ)(qE(χ) − 1) and the expected number of illegal links is
Thus we expect b patterns in the system. Second, we estimate the necessary number of event traces that cover all "allowed" links called the clean set, since it may not contain any counterfeits. Between each two consecutive stages there are a allowed links and each needs to be present in at least one trace. We assume that the probability of links occurring at different stages is independent. We observe q stages in parallel and the number of necessary event traces is determined by the maximum number of links between any two stages. The probability density function of the maximum is given by
The expected value of the maximum is
If we assume that the probability of the occurrence of each link is uniform, then determining the expected number of traces, such that each link occurs at least once is an instance of the coupon collector's problem. The expected number of traces necessary can be then computed as
The formula for computing the expected number of traces necessary in case of a non-uniform distribution can be found in [7] .
We will continue using numbers inspired by a real-world example. Assume a supply chain with q = 5 stages and let the number of parties at a stage be uniformly distributed between 1 and 5. The expected number of parties at a stage E(χ) = 3 and the expected number of parties in the entire supply chain is l = 15.
Exceptional situations may significantly increase the necessary size of the clean set, such that in practice one can expect some false positives due to cases, such as a return delivery, and read errors, such as a failing RFID tag.
The expected number of allowed links between two stages is a = 9. The expected number of illegal links, i.e. patterns is b = 174. The expected value of the maximum number of links between any two stages is c = 16.1. The expected number of traces necessary in the clean set is then d = 58.5.
An inherent problem with our algorithm is that the detection of an anomaly is exponential in the length of the pattern. The algorithm has to exhaustively search O((lu) n ) possible combinations. In our use case of counterfeit detection in supply chains this does not pose a problem, since n = 2 and the search algorithm can be further optimized using hash tables to O(lu) expected time complexity.
We implemented the detection algorithm using 160-bit HMAC based SHA-1 on a 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon machine using Java 1.5 on Windows XP. We generated random patterns of a given length and matched them to randomly generated strings. We report the average of the spent wall clock time of 1000 runs of the matching algorithm. Figure 3 shows the results in milliseconds for a pattern length of 2 to 8 on a logarithmic scale. Even this non-optimized algorithm can perform counterfeit detection (n = 2) for a single pattern in less than 2 ms. Furthermore we see that detection times for pattern lengths up to 5 seem acceptable (< 1 s), but this assessment obviously depends on the rate of incoming events. Computation of the detection input at the event sources scales linearly in the pattern length O(n|J k |). On the test hardware we computed 1000 HMACs in 73 milliseconds and therefore this is not expected to be a performance bottleneck.
For each tag we need to communicate one PRF value per event in the pattern (n), per event source (l), per match up to the limit (u) and per pattern to match (b). The communication complexity is consequently O(nlub) per tag. Assuming the PRF length of 32 bits (4 bytes) from Section 4.3 we calculate 20 KBytes for our example.
We can estimate the communication cost when using secure multiparty computation with [2] . For this method we need a circuit implementing the pattern matching consisting of gates implementing any binary function. We construct this circuit from individual components from a library we have developed over a course of projects.
We start with a circuit that first sorts the events using a sorting network. Note that our algorithm does that implicitly. We continue our example and assume l = 15 parties which supply u = 1 event each. The event type corresponds to the party identifier and consists of 4 bits. The numbering of events consists of 8 bits. A sort-and-exchange operation in a sorting network can then be implement using 73 gates. Using Batcher's construction we need 80 such operations. The result must be compared to b = 174 at l * u − n + 1 = 14 positions with n = 2 events. The results of this comparison are condensed into the output bit -match or no match.
The entire circuit consists of 47252 gates. For each gate we need 4l = 60 keys of 80 bits which results in 216 MByte which needs to be communicated by each computing party. This results in an overall communication of 3.2 GByte -compared to our 20 KByte a factor of more than ·10 6 . Our exponential computation complexity seems very reasonable compared with these absolute numbers.
